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SOCIAL RESILIENCE AND HARMONY IN THE CONTEXT OF INCOME INEQUALITY AND INTOLERANCE

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INTRODUCTION

A large body of work has been written about inter-ethnic peace and reconciliation, both between countries and within heterogeneous cities, yet we can perceive a slight flaw, as most of it observes ethno-religious societies as monolithic. We shouldn't make the mistake of attributing agency to nations or ignoring the divisions within them (Patterson 1988). Keeping in mind class conflict and societal differences and viewing reconciliation while thus reinforced, we ask a further question: Are there class-based differences in approaches to reconciliation, and how can this be used to improve the process?

By this we mean to add a novel approach, as the debate about reconciliation is mostly oriented towards dialogue, emotion, and the direct interaction between communities. By asking if there is a difference between the approaches to social reconciliation and solidarity between people of different incomes and means in the respective societies, we can attempt an indirect solution from within societies rather than between them, which is a much harder task. If having greater incomes and means decreases nationalist and religiously exclusive behavior, and if lower income leads to lower tolerance, then overall reconciliation between communities can be achieved by economic betterment, which in the case of a city can be done through government intervention rather than inter-community negotiation.

At the same time the concept of social resilience has not been approached from a position of ethno-religious peace between communities within cities, which we perceive as a flaw as resilience rests upon a functioning society of solidarity and mutual aid, which cannot exist in divided societies. If greater economic betterment and a reduction of inequality decreases intolerance and aids reconciliation, then the city with a heterogeneous population becomes more resilient and conducive to cooperation and effort towards the common good of all citizens.

In ethnically diverse cities it is important to maintain a civic harmony and peace between the various sub societies. As we show, intolerance grows in reverse proportion to income, where people of lower means have a greater tendency for social intolerance. Ethnic peacebuilding is usually observed through inter-ethnic dialogue and attention is not given to an indirect improvement which can have a benefit on all ethnic groups: the reduction of income inequality and the improvement of the standard of living for people of lesser means. By arguing that improving incomes will decrease intolerance, we propose that social resilience can be built by reducing intolerance through economic programs.

SOCIAL RESILIENCE IN RELATION TO SOCIAL HARMONY

Social resilience (SR) is connected directly to social capacities and enabling factors that help master threats by facilitating access, and its capacity depends on material and non material resources and structures (Obrist et al 2010). The main dimensions of SR are the coping capacities that overcome adversity, adaptive capacities to learn from experience, and transformative capacities to create institutions that support social welfare and robustness. Through studying resilience we can study society itself as it is related to the persistence of society (Keck and Sakdapolrak 2013). Resilience and vulnerability are concepts originating in ecology and in social sciences, focusing on stress, preventing irreversible negative changes and regenerating after disturbance. Vulnerability is not static but fluid and is agent-based, and is driven by social networks, which is why a bottom up approach should be used as people at the lower ends of society are the most vulnerable (Miller et al 2010). SR is multi-faceted, and includes the capacities of resistance, recovery and creativity, which differ in different segments of communities , with groups being differently resilient and have resilience to different threats. As threats cant be stopped, shielding people from consequences is vital, and its indicators include trust, leadership, collective efficacy, social capital, social cohesion, community involvement, social values, communication and resource dependency (Maguire and Hagan 2007).

Urban social resilience as a concept has been gaining ground especially in relation to climate change mitigation and adaptation, and the paradigm is part of the attempt to assess the ability of cities to transform their socio political and economic structures in line with a more challenging future environment (Bouzarovski and Gentile 2011) Political processes can support reducing vulnerability and increasing resilience more than previously thought, and those without a voice are increasingly more represented. This prevents them from being vulnerable and susceptible to disasters. However the vulnerable depend on society and the institutions that aid in income distribution and welfare programs to make them more resilient as they are then more included in social structures (Voss 2008).

Social capital has a key role in building and maintaining social resilience, with social relations being an important component of transformation and resilience. In communities in which there are unequally distributed vulnerabilities and potentials for dealing with them resilience is low (Keck and Sakdapolrak 2013). Vulnerability is unequally distributed and there is an evident social polarization and residential segregation that produces negative effects for citizens as poor neighborhoods lack the social ties for social mobility. Trust in organizations and institutions increases the security citizens feel, and is a key component of SR (Kruget et al 2015) . SR can be increased by providing communities vulnerable to disasters with effective means of mitigation and strategies. SR is hard to measure but is important for raising awareness of exposure to risk and to aid risk assessment and preparedness in pre-disaster phases as well as absorptive-adaptive-transformative capacities in post-disaster phases. (Saja et al 2018).

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND CONFLICT

Not all social stratification is class stratification, but we can distinguish groups of people based on their material conditions, levels of education, standards and ways of living, and prestige (Kiuranov 1982). In the past class differences were more apparent than today. People are more likely to accept an attitude if others of the same social status do as well, with social context regulating the strength of the attitude. Social consensus has a strong impact on individual attitudes but those of higher status are more likely to hold onto their attitudes without wider social consensus about their correctness (Prislin et-al. 2012).

Neo-nationalism is a growing political force in European societies among the working-class in response to disenfranchisement. The upper-middle-class is becoming cosmopolitanized, and thus the working-class resistance is directed both towards domestic elites and foreign nations, and expressed through politics of fear (Kalb and Halmai 2011). Class differences exist due to unequal income levels and roles in production, (Berberoglu 2007), and Žižek considers right-wing populism to be a displaced version of working-class politics (2008). Identification with a collective reduces insecurity especially in the case of nationalism and in times of uncertainty, but this leads to the perception of superiority for the in-group in reference to outsiders (Kinnvall 2004).

The social system has a direct impact on the way people come to define their interests, and participants in the post-conflict experience have different viewpoints and agendas, causing a constant competition and dialogue over social justice that is exacerbated by conflict (Jeong and Lerche 2011). Members of the upper-class are more likely to have higher agency and pursue independence and autonomy through assertiveness, while members of lower classes are more likely to have higher communion aimed towards mass cooperation (Aydin et-al 2019), thus nationalism is less likely to affect the upper-class.. Nationalism more effectively mobilizes mass public opinion in opposition to perceived elitism, being more easily accepted by the working-class (Umney 2018).

While nationalism mobilizes a population to act outside of class interest, it still serves some classes more than others, and the class basis of a nationalist movement affects its character and direction (Berberoglu 1999). Nationalism is expressed differently based on class, being more significant for the working-class, while both nationalism and class conflict have the narrative of the oppressed rising against oppressors (Patterson 1988), whereas upper-classes rarely feel oppressed.

Political mobilization has different effects on social classes, as working-class voters are generally galvanized by ideology and simple discourse during acute political competitions (Hill and Leighley 1966). The mobilization historically was primarily nationalist. After WW2, class distinctiveness weakened, and so has class influence on voting, with valence voting becoming more important, weakening the links between class and party (Evans and Tilley 2011). Nationalism is spread by nationalist movements that transcend class, but are primarily populist and chauvinist, using the narrative of a mass uprising. Class interests are sublimated within them and they become directed against a compromising upper class that is juxtaposed against the true nation of the masses (Patterson 1988).

Nationalism itself is anti-elitist and the easiest identification and basis for identity, leading to national pride and a belief in superiority compared to others (Kohn, 1939). The fight for national rights was congruent with class struggle, with the working-class having the most to gain from this identification while the upper-class already felt superior through culture and status. Nationalism was often used to prevent class conflict by finding a common enemy and ensuring loyalty. Different classes have different views on nationalism and utility from it, and it can be seen as a form of class-conflict and control (Marx 2002), and as such have different approaches to reconciliation.

Social conflict is inevitable and peace depends on the narratives used by the subjects in specific contexts (Little 2011), but it can even be positive when it prevents the ossification of the social system by exerting pressure for creativity and change (Coser 1957). In Yugoslavia criticism of class privileges dissipated in the lead-up to the war, but a class-based difference in attitudes between the pro-war masses and the anti-war urban educated class was apparent throughout the conflict (Archer 2014). A difference in class-based attitudes to the war is a constant theme in the film. In post-colonial examples we observe the appearance of an upper-class which included both native and settler elites, contrasted to the nationalistic lower class. Reconciliation failed to address social inequalities and entrenched stratification (Tapscott 1993). Class is one of the main organizing principles around which major patterns of social conflict cohere, and its essence is the categorization of groups in society based on the role they perform and the income they receive which affect their social prestige and power (Young 1982).

CLASS BASED DIFFERENCES TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Reconciliation can occur both between classes or states, and while literature on it has a tendency for oversimplification, the need for mutual understanding is always emphasized (Little and Maddison 2017), but rarely is reconciliation between classes of different states analyzed in reference to it. Social conflict is often the product of a construction of the identities of the self as morally superior and the other as inferior, preventing a stable peace from occurring through reconciliation as mobilization based on this identity rationalizes violence (Wilmer 1998). In the film moral superiority is class-based, aiding reconciliation for aristocrats, while among the lower-classes it is nationalistic, disrupting it. During reconciliation the main actors can become locked into narratives based on opposition to the perceived position of the other, creating a “disjunctured synthesis” where radically exclusive positions are co-dependent (Little 2011).

Reconciliation seeks to create a shared vision of society which leads to substantive social change towards peace, but class can lead to dissenting views on the shape and form of internal and external reconciliation due to incompatible visions of change (Little 2017). Reconciliation rests on delegitimizing violence as a means of dealing with a conflict (Jeong and Lerche 2002). Openness to other cultures and ideas is a necessary factor in reconciliation as understanding “the other” lowers perceived threats, and due to the higher education levels and cultural capital of elites they expectedly show greater openness to each other.

International peace should also bring social peace within a state and improve social cohesion (MacGinty et-al 2016), but when social conflicts remain they affect reconciliation negatively.. Identity politics influence conflict resolution through the interplay between ontological security and ethnic nationalism. In the example of Cyprus the conflicted parties reproduce conflict in relation to “the other”, harming reconciliation through nationalism (Ioizides 2015). Conflict produces an increase in nationalism and insecurity in a group, which exacerbates conflict in return. Nationalism is more apparent among the working-class which is less ontologically secure than the upper-class which does not feel “La Patrie en danger. We shouldn’t ignore the fact that nationalism is a greater mobilizer than class (Patterson 1988).

CONCLUSION

In our essay we attempted to illustrate how the upper-classes of society more easily engage in inter-ethnic tolerance and reconciliation due to their increased levels of education, cultural capital and cosmopolitanism, which originate in their privileged status. We have done so by linking expressions of nationalism to a decrease of reconciliation, and the lower-classes with an increase of nationalist behavior. Nationalism stresses superiority towards the foreigner and precludes understanding and solidarity, and is linked to feelings of insecurity in society. Our effort was to stress that class and class-based differences play an important role in reconciliation and should not be ignored. Thus we suggest that a decrease in the gap between the classes, and an increased standard of living for working-class people, would lead to an increase in the acceptance of reconciliation and a decrease in exclusive nationalism.

Social inequality increases nationalism and intolerance, at the same time low income people are less cosmopolitan and tolerant as they have greater insecurity and lower access to education, travel and culture. Decreasing inequality and giving greater social access to people of lower means lowers tension and exclusion, creates greater social harmony, and creates greater social resilience. Class divisions and poverty lead to increased inter ethnic and inter religious tensions, dividing communities and making them ineffective when a crisis hits

Instead of focusing on interethnic tensions and politically-led reconciliation which is a hard task, we find that it is useful to focus on economic improvement, for if income improvement decreases intolerance and can be done unilaterally, it should be prioritized in this respect. The solution we find is that we should be decreasing inequality and improving the standard of living and education for people of lower means through government support, in order to build social resilience.

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